The ANZAC landings at Gallipoli were a success

New evidence suggests the landings at Gallipoli were, in fact, a cleverly orchestrated and successful assault. It was the British follow-up that failed

It's one of the central threads of Anzac mythology. That at dawn on April 25, 1915, our gallant Diggers - "lions led by donkeys" - were sent on to the Gallipoli beaches and the lethal Turkish guns in an ill-planned assault ordered by incompetent British commanders.

But Hugh Dolan, a serving intelligence officer in the Australian military, claims in a new book to have discovered long-ignored evidence "which turns the Anzac legend on its head". Far from being a disaster, Dolan believes the Anzac landings should be remembered as a success - a daring and unorthodox amphibious assault which was without precedent in modern warfare.
One of the architects of the plan, Lieutenant General William Birdwood.

One of the architects of the plan, Lieutenant General William Birdwood.

In 36 Days: The Untold Story Behind the Gallipoli Landings, Dolan insists the three key Australian officers who planned the operation made ground-breaking use of military intelligence - including aerial reconnaissance photographs - to put together an almost flawless plan.

But their triumph has been overshadowed by the disasters which happened after the landings, Dolan argues, completely distorting what was achieved on the original Anzac Day.

"The most glaring error is the fact it is always described as a dawn landing," says Dolan. "It wasn't. A dawn attack is a daylight attack. This was a silent night attack. It took place in complete darkness.

"I suggest we take down the bronze plaque at Anzac Cove which describes it as a dawn landing, and recast another that is more accurate. And the Department of Veterans' Affairs should update its website, too."

Squadron Leader Dolan - who studied history at Oxford University - worked in military intelligence for several years in the British Army before returning home to Australia to join the Royal Australian Air Force. Now 47, he is an intelligence officer based in Melbourne.

Dolan's book dwells on the 36 days it which the plan was formed and executed - and makes use of Turkish records as well as well as Allied military intelligence. "As far as I can see, no one has focused on the planning before," Dolan says.

Charles Bean, the Herald war correspondent, showed in his diaries that he was aware of some of the military intelligence that went into the planning, but did not include it in his official history: the bible of Anzac mythology. That was partly because the military intelligence was kept secret until 1965.

The result is that the success or failure of the Anzac landing has been judged on whether it achieved the targets outlined in the original British battle plan prepared by Sir General Ian Hamilton, the commander of the 80,000 Allied force.

But Dolan says the three Australian architects of the Anzac Cove landings (Lieutenant General William Birdwood, Major General William Throsby Bridges and Colonel Brudenell White) received Hamilton's permission to change their objectives - and the time of their assault from dawn to pre-dawn.

"They did something extraordinary," says Dolan. "They sent their military intelligence officer, Major Charles Villiers-Stuart, on an aerial reconnaissance mission over Anzac Cove on April 14, 1915. He sat in the back seat [of the two-man biplane] with a pair of binoculars and a 1/40,000 scale map. He was able to determine the strength and position of the Turkish forces on the ridges [behind Anzac Cove]."

At the subsequent intelligence briefing, Villiers-Stuart told his superiors that Hamilton's assumptions about the northern beaches being relatively unprotected were wrong. Anzac Cove was defended by several batteries, barbed wire and entrenchments.

"That led to a reappraisal at Anzac headquarters. Here something special happens," says Dolan. "Instead of landing and advancing [across the Gallipoli peninsula] to Maidos on the Dardenelles, they gained Hamilton's permission to change their orders."

Their new objective was to land and draw the Turkish forces onto them, giving the British the breathing space to land the main attack in the south. "We also have the Anzac commanders doing something the British do not do. They fold the military intelligence they get each day into their [revised battle plan]. The British flew 18 photographic missions over their beaches. But Hamilton never used the intelligence.

"Their attitude was almost like playing cricket. They thought it was somehow unfair, whereas the Anzac commanders insisted on getting their own man in the air to learn about the enemy and use it to their advantage."

The original Hamilton plan had been for the Anzacs to attack at the same time as the British, about 7am. "But the Anzac commanders realised they would be caught in the open and slaughtered by the 32 artillery barrels pointing at them. Their solution was most unorthodox. It had not been practised in modern military history. They launched a silent, night-time assault to land the Anzac troops ashore in the hours of darkness.

"This was very carefully planned right down to the placement of carpet on the decks of the warships to muffle the sound of the men's hobnail boots. They also put velvet around the oarlocks of the rowing boats.

"There was no preliminary bombardment … It was silent, stealthy, professional and very modern. By 4.20am, the first wave was ashore. By 5am, Birdwood was crowing to Hamilton that 5500 men had landed. Dawn wasn't until 5.20am."

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